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DEFINING "USE" OF A FIREARM
Bailey v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 501 (1995)
I. INTRODUCTION
In Bailey v. United States,' the United States Supreme Court held
that in order to "use" a firearm in relation to a drug-trafficking crime
within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1), a criminal defendant
must actively employ the weapon.2 In separate and unrelated cases,
petitioners RolandJ. Bailey and Candisha S. Robinson were convicted
in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia of, inter
alia, using or carrying a firearm in relation to a drug trafficking of-
fense in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1). Different panels of the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed 3
and reversed 4 the petitioners' convictions, respectively. The D.C. Cir-
cuit subsequently consolidated the two cases for en banc reconsidera-
tion, wherein the court affirmed both Bailey's and Robinson's
convictions. 5 Bailey and Robinson then jointly petitioned for certio-
rari and the Supreme Court of the United States granted the petition
in order to clarify the meaning of "use" under § 924(c)(1).6
This Note argues that the Court properly concluded that a de-
fendant must "actively employ" a firearm in a manner that makes the
firearm an operative factor in the predicate crime in order to violate
18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1). The Note then explains how the unanimous
decision, written by Justice O'Connor, narrowed the scope of
§ 924(c) (1) from the broad, far-reaching scope that O'Connor herself
had implied in the majority opinion in Smith v. United States,7 a previ-
ous Supreme Court decision regarding the scope of conduct reached
by the statute.
Finally, this Note discusses whether the Court's recommendation
that prosecutors charge offenders who mix guns and drugs under the
"carry" prong of § 924(c) could lead lower courts to expand the stat-
1 116 S. Ct. 501 (1995).
2 Id at 506.
3 United States v. Bailey, 995 F.2d 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
4 United States v. Robinson, 997 F.2d 884 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
5 United States v. Bailey, 36 F.d 106 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (en banc).
6 Bailey v. United States, 115 S. Ct. 1689 (1995).
7 508 U.S. 223 (1993).
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ute's scope to reach the very conduct that the Court excluded in Bai-
ley. As a normative matter, the Note argues that an astute definition of
"carrying a firearm" should not include storing a firearm which is
proximate to and accessible during a drug transaction.
II. BACKGROUND
A. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF 18 u.s.c. § 924(c) (1)
18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1) mandates an enhanced sentence8 for any-
one who "during and in relation to any crime of violence or a drug-
trafficking crime ... uses or carries a firearm."9 The current version
of § 924(c) (1) resulted from a number of amendments that reflected
Congress' concern over the increasing number of violent and narcot-
ics-related crimes.10 Congress originally adopted § 924(c) (1) as part
of the Gun Control Act of 1968.11 The section created a separate of-
fense for using or unlawfully carrying a firearm during the commis-
sion of any felony, and penalized its violation with a sentence of not
less than one year or more than ten years.12
The pressures leading to the eventual adoption of § 924(c) (1)
were complex. Throughout the 1970's, an overcrowding of prisons,
8 An enhancing statute, § 924(c) (1) in this instance, has the sole purpose of imposing
more severe penalties in cases where firearms facilitate the commission of the predicate
drug trafficking crime. United States v. Stewart, 779 F.2d 538, 540 (9th Cir. 1985) (Ken-
nedy, J.).
9 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1) (1994). The full text of§ 924(c) (1) provides in pertinent part
that:
Whoever, during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime ...
for which he may be prosecuted in a court of the United States, uses or carries a
firearm, shall, in addition to the punishment provided for such crime of violence or
drug trafficking crime, be sentenced to imprisonment for five years .... Notwith-
standing any other provision of law, the court shall not place on probation or suspend
the sentence of any person convicted of a violation of this subsection, nor shall the
term of imprisonment imposed under this subsection run concurrently with any other
term of imprisonment including that imposed for the crime of violence or drug traf-
ficking crime in which the firearm was used or carried.
Id.
10 MichaelJ. Riordan, Using a Firearm During and in Relation to a Drug Trafficking Cime:
Defining the Elements of the Mandatory Sentencing Provision of 18 USC § 924(c)(1), 30 DuQ. L.
REV. 39, 40 (1991).
11 Gun Control Act, 82 Stat. 1213, 1224 (1968) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c) (1) (1994)).
12 Id. The text of the original § 924(c) stated:
Whoever-
(1) uses a firearm to commit any felony for which he may be prosecuted in a court of
the United States, or
(2) carries a firearm unlawfully during the commission of any felony for which he may
be prosecuted in a court of the United States, shall in addition to the punishment
provided for the commission of such felony, be sentenced to a term of imprisonment
for not less than one year nor more than ten years ....
18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1968).
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coupled with the failure of increased sentence lengths to reduce the
amount of drug related crimes, led Congress to become disenchanted
with mandatory minimum sentencing for drug crimes.' 3 However,
the continued escalation of violent crime in the 1970's and 1980's and
the public dissatisfaction with judicial discretion in sentencing led to
renewed support by Congress for mandatory sentencing.1 4 As a result,
Congress passed the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984,
which amended § 924(c) (1) to read: "Whoever, during and in rela-
tion to any crime of violence... uses or carries a firearm... shall in
addition to the punishment provided for such crime of violence, be
sentenced to imprisonment for five years."15 Pursuant to this amend-
ment, the new predicate offense became "any crime of violence," and
the statute required the firearm to be used or carried "during and in
relation to" the predicate offense. 16
Courts quickly experienced difficulties in interpreting what con-
stituted a "crime of violence," especially in the context of drug-traffick-
ing.1 7 Some courts held that drug trafficking did constitute a crime of
violence while others arrived at the opposite conclusion.' 8 This split
led Congress to pass the Firearm Owners' Protection Act of 1986,
which amended § 924(c) (1) to include specifically the predicate of-
fense of drug trafficking. 19
Congress has since amended § 924(c) (1) to mandate harsher
sentencing in cases where the defendant uses a more destructive class
of weapons.20 The sentence becomes ten years if the firearm used in
the predicate offense is a short-barreled rifle, a short-barreled shot-
gun, or semiautomatic assault weapon; and the sentence becomes
thirty years if the firearm is a machine-gun, a destructive device, or is
equipped with a firearm silencer or firearm muffler. 21
13 Riordan, supra note 10, at 39-40.
14 Cindy Crane, Note, L. Smith v. United States: Enhanced Penalties For Using Guns As
Barter In Drug Deals, 20J. CoNTEMp. L. 295, 299 (1994).
15 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)-(2) (1984), amended by 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (1994).
16 Id. (emphasis added). The "in relation to" language was added to allay the concern
that § 924(c)(1) would be applied where the firearm's presence played no part in the
crime committed. Riordan, supra note 10, at 40.
17 Crane, supra note 14, at 299.
18 See, e.g., United States v. Bushey, 617 F. Supp. 292 (D.Vt. 1985) (stating that the
common combination of firearms and narcotics does not make narcotics distribution by its
nature a violent crime); United States v. Jernigan, 612 F. Supp. 382 (E.D.N.C. 1985) (rul-
ing that possession of cocaine with intent to distribute is not a crime of violence pursuant
to § 924(c) (1)).
19 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (1994).
20 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1) (1990), amended by 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (1994).
21 Id.
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B. THE CIRCUIT COURTS' INTERPRETATION OF 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1)
While the 1986 amendment clarified that § 924(c) (1) did indeed
reach the use of firearms where the predicate crime was one of drug
trafficking, the amendment failed to guide the courts in construing
what constituted "use" of a firearm under the statute.22 Accordingly,
the circuit courts were forced to wrestle with the issue of defining the
nebulous term.23 Although the majority of circuits concluded that the
statute reached a broad range of conduct, the statute was applied in-
consistently and unpredictably. In some circuits, for example, the
mere presence of firearms at the scene of a drug trafficking crime was
sufficient to constitute use, since the weapons could be used to pro-
tect the defendants' drugs, cash, or paraphernalia, and thereby in-
crease the likelihood that the crime would succeed.24 Other circuits,
however, required that a firearm be strategically placed and readily
available for use during the underlying crime.25 In some of these cir-
cumstances, the conduct constituting "use" was interpreted so broadly
22 Jamilla A Moore, Comment, These Are Drugs. These Are Drugs Using Guns. Any Ques-
tions? An Analysis of the Diverse Applications of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1), 30 CAL. W. L. Rxv. 179,
182 (1993).
23 1&
24 The First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C.
circuits applied this "drug fortress" doctrine in interpreting § 924(c) (1)'s "use" require-
ment. See generally United States v. Nelson, 6 F.3d 1049 (4th Cir. 1993) (affirming the
conviction where police found guns and drugs in the same room); United States v. Travis,
993 F.2d 1316 (8th Cir. 1993) (weapon found in locked glove compartment properly sup-
ported conviction of defendant who did not own the car or possess the key to the glove
compartment); United States v. Dietz, 991 F.2d 443 (8th Cir. 1993); United States v.Jeffer-
son, 974 F.2d 201 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (use can be accomplished without actually employing
the firearm); United States v. Ivy, 973 F.2d 1184 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding that a gun lo-
cated in briefcase was sufficient to show use); United States v. Castro-Lara, 970 F.2d 976
(1st Cir. 1992) (stating that conviction was proper where the defendant picked up drugs in
a car with an unloaded gun and cash in the trunk); United States v. Smith, 957 F.2d 835
(11th Cir. 1992) (stating that the defendant need not intend to use the firearm as a
weapon to constitute use); United States v. Torres-Medina, 935 F.2d 1047 (9th Cir. 1991)
(use requirement satisfied where a gun was found in a crawl-space below the house even
though the defendant was a paraplegic and was unable to retrieve the weapon); United
States v. Head, 927 F.2d 1361 (6th Cir. 1991) (finding that a shotgun found with crack
cocaine in defendant's apartment was sufficient to constitute use); United States v. Parrish,
925 F.2d 1293 (10th Cir. 1991) (firearm located on a closet shelf above the defendant
during an attempted drug transaction constituted use); United States v. Garrett, 903 F.2d
1105 (7th Cir. 1990) (affirming conviction where defendant entered driver's side of a car
in which cocaine and a gun were found under the seat).
25 The Second and Third Circuits applied this "ready access" doctrine in interpreting
the scope of the statute. See generally United States v. Medina, 944 F.2d 60 (2d Cir. 1991)
(holding that a gun left on a bedroom dresser was used because it was strategically placed
and readily available for use during a transaction that occurred in the living room); United
States v. Theodoropoulos, 866 F.2d 587 (3rd Cir. 1989) (holding that the presence in plain
view of a loaded firearm evidenced the defendant's need for security and therefore consti-
tuted use).
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that the scope of use may have been enlarged beyond what Congress
originally intended.2 6
C. SMITH V UNITED STA TS' THE SUPREME COURT SPEAKS ON
§ 924(c) (1)
The Supreme Court first considered the scope of § 924(c) (1) in
Smith v. United States,27 a case where the Court attempted to resolve a
split in the circuits over whether the term "use" was to be defined
broadly enough to bring guns used as barter in drug deals within the
purview of the statute.28 The defendant in Smith was convicted under
§ 924(c) (1) after he offered an undercover police officer a MAC-10
machine gun in exchange for a two ounces of cocaine.29 The defend-
ant appealed his case to Supreme Court arguing that § 924(c) (1)'s
penalty only covers situations in which the firearm was used as a
weapon.3 0
Writing for the majority, Justice O'Connor concluded that a de-
fendant who trades a firearm for drugs does in fact "use" it during and
in relation to a drug trafficking crime within the meaning of
§ 924(c) (1).31 In arriving at this conclusion, Justice O'Connor re-
jected the defendant's contention that the statute only referred to sit-
uations wherein the firearm was used as a weapon.32 Instead, she
reasoned that the term "use," not defined by the statute, should be
construed "in accord with its ordinary or natural meaning."33 The ma-
jority then concluded that the defendant "used" his firearm within the
ordinary or natural meaning of the word.3 4 "By attempting to trade
his MAC-10 for the drugs, he 'used' or 'employed' it as an item of
barter to obtain cocaine; he 'derived service' from it because it was
26 Crane, supra note 14, at 301.
27 508 U.S. 223 (1993).
28 Compare United States V. Harris, 959 F.2d 246, 262 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (per curium)
(holding that the § 924(c) (1) "use" requirement is broad enough to cover guns used as
barter in drug transactions because the introduction of guns into the crime scene, whether
used for protection or as a medium of exchange, heightens danger to society) with United
States v. Phelps, 877 F.2d 28, 30 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that trading a gun for drugs does
not constitute use of a firearm under the statute since Congress directed the statute at
people carrying a firearm as an offensive weapon for a specific criminal act).
29 Smith, 508 U.S. at 226.
30 Id. at 227.
'31 Id. at 241.
32 Id. at 229.
33 Id at 228-29. The majority cited two sources in interpreting the ordinary meaning of
.use." The definitions include: "to convert to one's service" or "to employ," WEBSTERS NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH LANGUAGE 2806 (2d ed. 1949); "to make use of; to
convert to one's service; to employ; to avail oneself of; to utilize; to carry out a purpose or
action by means of," BLACK'S LAw DiCriONARY 1541 (6th ed. 1990).
'4 Smith, 508 U.S. at 229.
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going to bring him the very drugs he sought."35 Although Justice
O'Connor's majority decision limited the Court's holding to the nar-
row case of firearms used for barter in drug transactions, the decision
nonetheless implied that the "use" requirement be interpreted
broadly.36
Justice Scalia, in dissent, argued that "to use an instrumentality
ordinarily means to use it for its intended purpose."37 He conse-
quently asserted that the ordinary meaning of "using a firearm" is us-
ing the firearm as a weapon.38 Justice Scalia then declared that the
majority's interpretation produced a "strange dichotomy," since using
a firearm for any purpose necessarily includes carrying a firearm,
thereby blurring the line between the two prongs of the statute.39 Jus-
tice Scalia also noted that under the 1984 version of the statute, Con-
gress clearly wanted to deter the use of firearms which facilitated
violent crime.40 Thus, the purpose of § 924(c) (1) was not being
served if the statute reached situations where a defendant did not use
or intend to use the firearm in violent manner.41 As a result, Justice
Scalia concluded that the defendant's use of a firearm as an item in
commerce did not constitute "use" under the meaning of
§ 924(c) (1).42
The Smith court's implication of a broadly-defined use require-
ment opened the door to an expansive interpretation of § 924(c) (1)
35 Id.
36 For example, the Court stated that the statute's language "sweeps broadly, punishing
any 'use' of a firearm, so long as the use is 'during and in relation to' a drug trafficking
offense." t. The Court stated that the phrase "in relation to" clarified that the presence
or involvement of the firearm cannot be the result of accident or coincidence, but rather
must have some purpose or effect with respect to the predicate offense. Id. at 238. The
Court then broadly defined this requirement, stating that the firearm "at least must 'facili-
tate, or have the potential of facilitating' the drug trafficking offense." Id. (quoting United
States v. Stewart, 779 F.2d 538, 539 (9th Cir. 1985) (Kennedy, J.). Justice Blackmun con-
curred in Smith in order to highlight the majority's interpretation of the "in relation to"
language. He interpreted the phrase to require more than mere furtherance or facilita-
tion of the predicate crime. Smith, 508 U.S. at 241. (Blackmun, J., concurring). However,
because Justice Blackmun agreed that a reasonable construction of the phrase includes
trading a weapon for drugs, he felt it unnecessary to define the exact contours of the
language under § 924(c) (1). Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring).
37 Smith, 508 U.S. at 242 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justices Stevens and Souterjoined in
Justice Scalia's dissent. M. at 241.
38 Id. at 245-46 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
39 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
4 Id. at 246 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
41 Id.
42 Id. at 243, n.1 (ScaliaJ., dissenting). Justice Scalia illustrated his view by contending
that the objective falsity requirement for a perjury conviction could not be satisfied if a
wimess responded "No" when asked if he had ever used a firearm, even though he had
once sold an antique rifle to a collector. Id.
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that could further Congress' war against drugs and violent crime.43 It
also lent support to the similarly broad standards previously utilized by
the circuit courts to interpret the scope of conduct within the purview
of § 924(c) (1). 44 However, because the Smith decision failed to give
an express opinion on the breadth of the statute or resolve the incon-
sistencies in the lower courts, it remained to be seen whether the
courts would continue to utilize § 924(c) (1) to deter violent and drug
trafficking crimes.45 As a result, the issue was ripe for the Supreme
Court's consideration 46 in United States v. Bailey.47
IIl. FA(TrS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. BAILEY'S ARREST, TRIAL, AND PANEL APPEAL
On May 2, 1988, two District of Columbia Metropolitan police
officers stopped Roland J. Bailey's vehicle after noticing that Bailey
was driving without a front license plate or inspection stickers.48 After
Bailey handed one of the officers an identification card instead of a
driver's license, the officer ordered Bailey to get out of his car.49
While Bailey was exiting the vehicle, the officer saw Bailey push some-
thing between the front seat and the console that separated the front
two seats.50 Consequently, the officers searched the passenger com-
partment of the car and found one round of .380-caliber ammunition
and a brown leather pouch containing a total of thirty grams of co-
caine packaged separately in 27 plastic bags.51 After arresting Bailey,
the officers unlocked and searched the trunk of the car, in which,
among several bags of clothing, the officers recovered a loaded nine
millimeter Smith and Wesson pistol and roughly $2,500 in cash.52
The government indicted Bailey for (1) possession with intent to dis-
tribute five grams or more of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 841 (a); (2) using or carrying a firearm during and in relation to a
drug-trafficking offense, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924 (c) (1); and (3)
possession of a firearm by a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).5 3
43 Crane, supra note 14, at 305.
44 See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
45 Crane, supra note 14, at 305.
46 Moore, supra note 22, at 198-200 (calling for the Supreme Court to adopt a definite
standard for § 924(c)(1) prosecutions).
47 Bailey v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 501 (1995).
48 Brief for Petitioners at 1, Bailey v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 501 (1995) (Nos. 94-7448,
94-7492).
49 Id. at 1-2.





"USE" OF A FIREARM
At trial, Detective Charles DiDomenico, an experienced narcotics
expert, testified that the cocaine found in Bailey's trunk was packaged
in $50 bags and intended for street sale.5 4 He also testified that drug
dealers often carry firearms not only to protect themselves, but also to
"protect their assets, drugs and money."55 Thejury found Bailey guilty
and, in addition to the concurrent terms of 51 months each for the
first and third charges, the court sentenced him to a mandatory 60
months pursuant to § 924(c) (1).56
On appeal, Bailey argued that the Court should reverse his
§ 924(c) (1) conviction because the evidence was insufficient for the
jury to find that he "used" the gun "during and in relation to" a drug
trafficking crime, as required by the statute.57 The majority panel of
the court of appeals rejected Bailey's argument, reasoning that the
requirements of the statute were satisfied if the gun in any way facili-
tated Bailey's commission of his drug trafficking offense.58 The court
ruled that such facilitation could include the mere presence of the
gun to provide protection in connection with Bailey's drug trafficking
offense.59 In addition, the majority stated that the jury could reason-
ably infer that the money in the trunk was derived from several al-
ready-completed transactions.60 Consequently, the court held that
the jury could have reasonably concluded that Bailey used the gun to
protect an earlier possession and distribution of drugs, and therefore
could have concluded that Bailey "used" the gun "during and in rela-
tion to" a drug trafficking offense.61
54 Brief for the United States at 3, Bailey v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 501 (1995) (Nos.
94-7448, 94-7492).
55 Brief for Petitioners at 3, Bailey v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 501 (1995) (Nos. 94-7448,
94-7492).
56 United States v. Bailey, 995 F.2d 1113, 1114 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
57 Id. at 1118. Bailey argued for reversal on the strength of United States v. Der, 990 F.2d
1330 (D.C. Cir. 1993), and United States v. Bruce, 939 F.2d 1053 (D.C. Cir. 1991). Both of
these cases involved guns that were found in close proximity to drugs. In each case, the
court held that while such evidence might sufficiently show an intention to use the gun in
a future act of distribution, it was not sufficient to demonstrate "use" during and in rela-
tion to the predicate offense of possession with intent to distribute.
58 The Court of Appeals distinguished the case at bar from Derr and Bruce on the
ground that those cases involved future drug distributions, whereas the present case in-
volved Bailey's potential use of a gun in a transaction that had already occurred. Bailey,
995 F.2d at 1118.
59 Id. at 1116.
60 Id. at 1117 (citing United States v. Curry, 911 F.2d 72, 80 (8th Cir. 1990) (stating that
it is permissible to infer that large amounts of unexplained cash found in close proximity
to both guns and cocaine came, at least in part, from drug sales)).
61 Id. at 1119.
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B. ROBINSON'S ARREST, TRIAL, AND PANEL APPEAL
On July 15, 1991, undercover officer Larry Hale of the District of
Columbia Metropolitan Police Department approached Veloria
Robinson, the sister of petitioner Candisha Robinson, to solicit a sale
of crack cocaine.62 Veloria took Hale to petitioner Robinson's apart-
ment in Northeast Washington. 63 Upon entering the apartment and
informing Robinson that he wanted a "twenty," Hale observed the two
sisters go into the apartment's bedroom and saw Candisha hand
Veloria a rock of crack cocaine.64 Veloria then gave the rock to Hale
in exchange for $20 in marked money.65
The next evening, Hale returned to petitioner Robinson's apart-
ment where he purchased another "twenty" from a man named
Kwarme Parker, who said that he lived in the apartment with Robin-
son.66 About thirty minutes after the purchase, the police executed a
search warrant at Robinson's apartment which led to the discovery of
a locked foot-locker in the bedroom closet.67 The foot-locker con-
tained, among other things, an unloaded .22-caliber Derringer, two
rocks of crack cocaine weighing a total of 10.88 grams, and the
marked $20 bill which Hale had used to purchase the crack the previ-
ous day.68
Candisha Robinson was subsequently indicted on six counts, in-
cluding using or carrying a firearm on July 16, 1991, during and in
relation to a drug-trafficking offense in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c) (1).69 At trial, a government expert testified that a Derringer,
like the one recovered from the footlocker, was a "second gun" which
62 Brief for Petitioners at 4, Bailey v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 501 (1995) (Nos. 94-7448,
94-7492).







69 The five other counts of Robinson's indictment included: (1) distributing crack co-
caine onJuly 15, 1991, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841 (a)(1); (2) distributing crack cocaine
within 1000 feet of a public school on July 15, 1991, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 (a)(1),
841(b)(1) (C), and 860(a), and 18 U.S.C. § 2; (3) possession of five or more grams of co-
caine on July 16, 1991, with intent to distribute it, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 (a)(1),
841(b) (1)(B) (iii), and 18 U.S.C. § 2; (4) possession of five or more grams of cocaine
within 1000 feet of a public school on July 16, 1991, with intent to distribute it, in violation
of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 (a)(1), 841 (b)(1)(C), and 860(a), and 18 U.S.C. § 2; and (5) know-
ingly making available for use a building, room, or enclosure for the purpose of using,
storing, manufacturing, or distributing cocaine on or aboutJuly 16, 1991, in violation of 21
U.S.C. § 856(a) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. Brief for Petitioners at 5-6, Bailey v. United States, 116
S. Ct. 501 (1995) (Nos. 94-7448, 94-7492).
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drug dealers typically hide on their bodies until they are able to get to
a "real gun" that has more firepower.70 The expert further asserted
that drug dealers generally use guns in order to protect themselves
from "stickup boys,"71 rival gangs, lower-level employees and the
police. 72
Testifying on her own behalf, Robinson acknowledged that she
leased the apartment and received rent contributions from her sister
Veloria, Kwarme Parker (Veloria's boyfriend), and Sharine McKin-
ney.73 She also testified that she owned the footlocker which con-
tained the gun and drugs, but denied any knowledge of their
existence. 74 Although she admitted having knowledge that Parker was
selling drugs, she denied any knowledge that he sold drugs out of her
apartment.75 Finally, she denied her presence in the apartment on
the evening of July 15, 1991, when Hale's first drug purchase
occurred. 76
Following her conviction on all six counts, Robinson submitted a
post-verdict motion for judgment of acquittal directed solely at the
§ 924(c) (1) count.77 The district court denied this motion, reasoning
that because Robinson's apartment was a base for the distribution of
crack cocaine, the jury could legitimately infer that she used the gun
to protect the on-going possession of the drugs sold on her
premises. 78
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia reversed Robinson's conviction on the § 924(c) (1) count.79
The court observed that § 924 failed to criminalize mere possession of
firearms during and in relation to a drug trafficking offense. 80 Fur-
thermore, the court stated that the proximity of a gun to drugs did
not support a conviction under the statute.8' The court even ruled
that the future intention to use a firearm in connection with traffick-
ing drugs fell outside the statute unless the individual actually "uses"
70 Id. at 5.
71 "Stickup boys" are those who attempt to rob a dealer following a sale of drugs. I
72 Id




76 Id. at 6.
77 Id. Petitioner had made a similar mid-trial motion for acquittal aimed at the same
"uses or carries" count, which the district court denied. IM
78 United States v. Robinson, 779 F. Supp. 606, 608-09 (D.D.C. 1991).
79 United States v. Robinson, 997 F.2d 884 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
80 Id. at 887.
81 Id. at 890.
19971
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the firearm for that purpose.82
The court then defined an open-ended test that listed numerous
factors to prove actual use, including the number, type, and accessibil-
ity of the firearm, the proximity of the firearm to the drugs, and
whether the firearm was loaded or previously had been used.83 In
applying these factors to Robinson's case, the court held that an un-
loaded .22-caliber Derringer found in a locked footlocker in a bed-
room closet, without ammunition anywhere in the apartment, could
not reasonably support ajury determination of actual "use" under the
statute.8
4
C. THE D.C. CIRCUIT'S CONSOLIDATED EN BANC DECISION
In order to resolve the inconsistencies in the application of
§ 924(c) in the Bailey and Robinson cases, the Court of Appeals for the
D.C. Circuit consolidated the two cases and reheard them en banc.85
Upon reconsideration, a divided court upheld both convictions. 86
Writing for the five judge majority, then Judge Ginsburg rejected the
open-ended, multi-factor test utilized by Robinson's first appellate
panel to determine the sufficiency of evidence supporting a convic-
tion under § 924(c) (1).87 Judge Ginsburg wrote that in addition to
producing inconsistent results, the open-ended test required courts to
invade the province of the jury by weighing numerous factors and de-
termining the specific relevance of individual facts in order to deter-
mine the sufficiency of the evidence.88
In place of the open-ended test, the court employed a standard
for assessing the sufficiency of evidence that resembled the "proximity
and accessibility" standards used by other circuits.8 9 The court stated
that in order to obtain a conviction under the new standard, "the Gov-
ernment need only point to evidence that the firearm in question was
in proximity to the drugs, drug paraphernalia, or drug proceeds and
was accessible to the defendant from the site of the drugs, drug para-
phernalia, or drug proceeds involved in his or her predicate drug traf-
ficking offense."9 0 The court then ruled that using a gun to protect
one's drugs, drug paraphernalia, or the proceeds from one's drug
82 Id. at 887.
83 Id.
84 Id. at 888.
85 United States v. Bailey, 36 F.3d 106, 109 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (en banc).
86 Id. at 118.
87 Id.
88 Id. at 111-12.
89 Id. at 113. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
90 Id. at 118 (emphasis added).
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sales clearly violates the statute.91 Applying this interpretation, the
court held that both Bailey and Robinson "used" firearms during or in
relation to their respective drug trafficking offenses and consequently
affirmed both trial court convictions. 92
Judge Wald dissented, stating that the proximity and accessibility
test diminished the prospect of accurate assessment as to whether a
gun was used to facilitate the predicate drug offense. 93 Judge Wald
also asserted that the accessibility of the gun to the site of the drugs
was irrelevant, since under the statute, it is the defendant who must
use the gun, and not some "phantom defendant who is positioned
where the drugs are."94
Judge Williams, joined by Judges Silberman and Buckley, also dis-
sented, asserting that the majority's "'proximity' plus 'accessibility'
test" merely diluted the meaning of "use" by essentially defining it as
"simply possession with a floating intent to use."95 In place of the
majority's test, Judge Williams suggested that the wording, history and
context of the statute called for a bright line test requiring actual ac-
tive use rather than "possession with a contingent intent to use."96
The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari 97 in
order to clarify the meaning of "use" under § 924(c) (1).98
IV. THE SurREME COURT OPINION
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the D. C. Circuit
Court of Appeals.99 Writing for a unanimous court, Justice O'Connor
concluded that "use" under § 924(c) (1) requires that the defendant
actively use the firearm in a way that makes it an operative factor in
the predicate offense. 100 Pursuant to this interpretation, the Court
held that the evidence was insufficient to support either Bailey's or
Robinson's conviction for "use" of a firearm under the statute. 10'
In reaching its conclusion, the Court recognized the difficulties
in interpreting the word "use."10 2 The Court stated that the circuit
91 Id. at 115.
92 Id. at 118.
93 Id.
94 Id at 119.
95 Id. at 121.
96 Id.
97 Bailey v. United States, 115 S. Ct. 1689 (1995).
98 Bailey v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 501, 503 (1995).
99 Id. at 509.
100 Id. at 505.
101 Id. at 509.
102 Id. at 505. As an example of these different meanings, the Court considers the para-
doxical statement: "I use a gun to protect my house, but I've never had to use it." Id
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court correctly required that "use" connotes more than mere posses-
sion of a firearm, but erred in its standard of evaluating whether the
involvement of a firearm amounted to more than mere possession.10 3
The Court asserted that the ultimate result of defining facilitation and
use through a proximity and accessibility standard is that "possession
amounts to 'use' because possession enhances the defendant's confi-
dence." 10 4 Therefore, "nearly every possession of a firearm by a per-
son engaged in drug trafficking would satisfy the standard."' 0 5
In its subsequent determination that the government must show
active employment of a firearm in order to establish "use" under
§ 924(c) (1), the Court looked to the language, context, and history of
the statute. 10 6 In looking to the language of § 924(c) (1), the Court
considered not only the bare meaning of the word "use," 0 7 but also
its placement in the statutory scheme. 10 8 Assuming that Congress in-
tended each of the terms in its statutes to have particular, non-super-
fluous meanings, the Court focused on the statute's reference to two
specific types of conduct with a firearm: using and carrying.' 0 9 The
Court asserted that "[w] hile a broad reading of 'use' undermines vir-
tually any function for 'carry,' a more limited, active interpretation of
'use' preserves a meaningful role for 'carries' as an alternative basis
for a charge."1 0
Turning to the context of the statute, the Court subscribed to the
assumption that "using a firearm" should not have a different mean-
ing in § 924(c) (1) than it does in § 924(d).' 1 ' In § 924(d), Congress
provided for the forfeiture of a firearm that is "used" or "intended to
be used" in particular crimes.' 1 2 Because Congress provided separate
103 Id. at 506.
104 Id. (citing United States v. Bailey, 36 F.3d 106, 121 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (en banc) (Wil-
liams, J., dissenting)).
105 Id. (citing United States v. McFadden, 13 F.3d 463, 469 (4th Cir. 1994) (Breyer, C.J.,
dissenting)). The Court explained that if Congress had intended the statute to encompass
all situations involving mere possession, it would not have used the "use or carry" language.
Id. This conclusion, the Court stated, is readily supported by the frequent use of the term
possess" in gun-crime statutes. Id.
106 Id.
107 "Use" is variously defined as "to convert one's service," "to employ," "to avail oneself
of," and "to carry out a purpose or action by means of." Id. (citations omitted).
108 Id.
109 Id. at 507.
110 Id. at 506.
111 Id. Support for this assumption came from Smith v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2050,
2057 (1993) (stating that an ambiguous statutory provision is often "clarified by the re-
mainder of the statutory scheme-because the same terminology is used elsewhere in a
context that makes its meaning clear, or because only one of the permissible meanings
produces a substantive effect that is compatible with the rest of the law").
112 18 U.S.C. § 924(d) (1994).
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terms in § 924(d) for the forfeiture of firearms that are actually used
and those are that are merely intended to be used, the Court rea-
soned that if Congress had intended to broaden the application of
§ 924(c) (1) beyond actual use, it would have so specified. 113
The Court then examined the amendment history of § 924(c) to
support its conclusion that Congress intended the terms "use" and
"carry" to have distinct meanings. 114 This examination highlighted
the statute's original language, which separated the "use" and "carry"
provisions into separate clauses and modified the terms with "uses...
to commit" and "carries unlawfully."115 The Court posited that the
phrase "uses to commit" indicated that Congress originally intended
to reach only those situations in which a firearm was actively
employed.116
The Court then compared the original statute to the current lan-
guage, which contains "uses" and "carries" in the same clause without
modification, 117 and subsequently rejected the government's argu-
ment that Congress, through the amendment, stripped the terms of
the qualifications that originally made them distinct and thereby in-
tended their meanings to overlap." 8 Instead, the Court asserted that
if Congress had intended to deprive "use" of its active connotations, it
could have simply substituted "possession," a more appropriate
term.119
The Court next described activities that fall within "active employ-
ment" of a firearm, including "brandishing, displaying, bartering,
striking with, and most obviously, firing or attempting to fire, a fire-
arm."120 Even a defendant's making reference to a firearm that is in
his or her possession could satisfy the requirements of the statute.' 2 '
However, the Court stated that "if a gun is not disclosed or mentioned
by the offender, it is not actively employed, and it is not 'used.'" 122
The Court readily accepted that its active-employment interpreta-
tion of "use" significantly narrows the scope of § 924(c) (1).123 How-
ever, it noted that the government can still charge offenders who mix
gun and drugs with the "carry" prong of the statute, which reaches










123 Ia at 509.
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some offenders not covered by the "use" prong.1 24
Having determined that under § 924(c) (1), "use" denotes active
employment of a firearm in relation to a drug trafficking offense, the
Court subsequently concluded that the evidence was insufficient to
uphold the conviction of either Bailey or Robinson, as neither case
presented evidence that the guns found had been actively em-
ployed. 12 5 As a result, the Court reversed both convictions. 126 Be-
cause the Court of Appeals failed to consider whether the "carry"
prong of the statute reached the defendants' conduct, the Court re-
manded both cases for consideration of upholding the convictions on
that ground.127
V. ANALYsis
The unanimous opinion authored by justice O'Connor in United
States v. Bailey correctly concluded that Congress intended 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c) (1) only to reach those situations where a defendant actively
employs a firearm in a manner that makes that firearm an operative
factor in an underlying crime of violence or drug trafficking crime. 128
Despite this correct conclusion, the O'Connor opinion contained two
flaws. The Court's contention that Bailey is consistent with Smith v.
United States, a previous O'Connor decision which explored the scope
of § 924(c) (1) in the context of guns used as barter in a drug transac-
tion, is an attempt to nullify the Court's previous implication that the
scope of § 924(c) (1) is broad and far-reaching without admitting the
errors of that interpretation. 129 In addition, the Court's suggestion
that prosecutors look to the broader "carry" prong of the statute in-
vites prosecutors and lower courts to re-expand the scope of the stat-
ute to reach the very conduct that the Bailey court properly
excluded. 1 0 Astute statutory construction, however, should not yield
punishment under the statute in situations where a gun is merely






128 Id. at 505.
129 See Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 236 (1993) (implying a broad interpretation
of§ 924(c) (1) while holding that using a gun for barter in a drug transaction is "using" the
gun under the meaning of the statute).
130 See Bailey, 116 S. Ct. at 509.
131 Id. at 507 (proposing that "carrying" be interpreted as keeping a gun hidden in de-
fendant's clothing during a drug transaction).
[Vol. 87856
"USE" OF A FIREARM
A. BAILEY WAS CORRECTLY DECIDED
By rejecting the lower court's proximity and accessibility stan-
dard, and instead requiring the prosecution to show evidence of active
employment of a firearm in order to gain a conviction for "using" the
firearm under § 924(c) (1), the Court established a narrow interpreta-
tion of the statute that only punishes conduct that Congress intended
to be within the statute's reach.'3 2 Congress' intent that § 924(c) (1)
only punish active employment is evidenced by looking to common
canons of statutory interpretation, as well as the statute's amendment
history.'3 3
Pursuant to a common canon of construing statutory language,
courts assume that Congress intended each of its statutory terms to
have a particular, non-superfluous meaning.'3 Focusing on the stat-
ute's prohibition of two separate types of conduct, namely "using" and
"carrying" firearms, Bailey properly asserted that the broad definition
of "use" under the proximity and accessibility standard "undermines
virtually any function for 'carry. '"' 13 5 On the other hand, Bailey's ac-
tive-employment definition of "use" sufficiently differentiates the con-
duct reached by the two prongs of the statute, thereby giving "use"
and "carry" their requisite non-superfluous meanings. 3 6
The Bailey decision also properly ruled that if Congress intended
to strip the term "use" of its active connotations, it would have done so
by punishing a criminal's "possession of' or "intention to use" a fire-
arm. 3' 7 When drafting § 924(c) (1), Congress was well aware of these
terms and their potential for use in the statute, as Congress has previ-
ously employed such terms in statutes regarding firearms. 38 Because
Congress chose to punish actual use in § 924(c) (1), courts should de-
fine the term in a manner that connotes more than mere possession
or intention to use.'3 9 The appellate court's proximity and accessibil-
132 Id- at 505.
'33 I&
134 Platt v. Union Pac. R. Co., 99 U.S. 48, 58 (1879). See also Ratzlaf v. United States,
114 S. Ct. 655, 659 (1994) (stating that judges should hesitate "to treat [as surplusage]
statutory terms in any setting, and resistance should be heightened when the words de-
scribe an element of a criminal offense").
135 Baike, 116 S. Ct. at 507.
136 Id. The Court illustrated the viability of the active employment standard by demon-
strating that a defendant can use a firearm without carrying it when he puts the gun on
display during a drug transaction, and a defendant can carry a firearm without using it
when he hides the gun in his clothing during a drug transition. I.
137 Id. at 508-09.
138 One need not look far to find an example of such statutory language, as 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(d), the very next subsection of the same statute, provides for the forfeiture of a
firearm that is "used" or "intended to be ued' in certain crimes. Id. at 507 (emphasis added).
139 Id. at 506.
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ity standard failed in this regard by erasing any line distinguishing ac-
tual use from either possession or intention to use. 140 Conversely, the
standard set forth in Bailey draws a clear distinction between the pas-
sive possession or future intention to use a firearm that Congress ex-
cluded from punishment under § 924(c) (1) and the active
employment which the statute was intended to reach.141
In addition to the arguments brought forth by the Court in Bailey,
the statute's legislative history, as evidenced by both the 1984 and
1990 amendments, also supports the active employment standard.142
The 1984 amendment history, which addressed the congressional in-
tent regarding "use" of a firearm in connection with violent crime,
suggested that mere proximity of a firearm to drugs or drug-related
activity is insufficient to establish a conviction under § 924(c) (1). 1 4 3
Instead, the prosecution must show some evidence that the defendant
actively employed the firearm.
[T]he section was directed at persons who choose to carry a firearm as
an offensive weapon for a specific criminal act... Moreover, the require-
ment that the firearms use or possession be 'in relation to' the crime
would preclude [the statute's] application in a situation where its pres-
ence played no part in the crime, such as a gun carried in a pocket and
never displayed or referred to in the course of a pugilistic barroom
fight.144
The adoption of the 1990 amendment, which created a scale that
mandated increasingly longer penalties for the use of increasingly
more destructive weapons, 45 implied that Congress intended to re-
duce the amount of violence associated with the underlying crimes of
violence and drug-trafficking. Therefore, if the courts interpret "use"
to include conduct where the defendant does not use the firearm in a
violent manner, then the statute will punish beyond its intended
scope. 146 By narrowing the scope of § 924(c) (1) and requiring that a
defendant actively employ the weapon, the Court limited those pun-
ished by the statute to those persons who have raised the level of vio-
140 Id. at 508. Under the proximity and accessibility standard, a gun stored in a closet
during a drug transaction is "used" since its mere presence increases the owner's confi-
dence thereby facilitating the crime. Id. However, storage of a firearm in this manner,
without a more active employment, cannot reasonably be distinguished from mere posses-
sion or an intention to use the firearm in the future. Id.
141 Id. at 508-09.
142 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1)-(2) (1984), amended by 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1) (1994); 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c)(1) (1990), amended by 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (1994).
143 Moore, supra note 22, at 182.
144 Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L No. 98-473, reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.CAN. (98 Stat.) 3491, 3492 n.10.
145 See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
146 Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 245-46 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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lence associated with their underlying offense. 147
B. BAILEYV. SMIT9. COMPARING AND CONTRASTING TWO O'CONNOR
OPINIONS
The effect of the Supreme Court's decision in Bailey was to nar-
row the scope of § 924(c) (1) in order to prevent the statute's "use"
prong from reaching the broad range of conduct defined by stan-
dards such as the D.C. Circuit's proximity and accessibility stan-
dard.148 However, because the 1994 Supreme Court decision in Smith
v. United States implied that the statute should reach such conduct, it
was not surprising that some circuit courts defined "use" in such a
broad fashion.' 49
The Court argued that the broad language in Smith merely ex-
panded the definition of "use" to include situations where a firearm
was actively employed in a capacity other than as a weapon, and lower
courts incorrectly inferred that the statute reached any conduct in-
volving a firearm that facilitates an underlying drug trafficking
crime.' 50 However, the language and dynamics of the Smith decision
suggest that the Court in that case defined "use" broadly, bringing
conduct like that outlined in the D.C. Circuit's proximity and accessi-
bility standard within the purview of the statute.' 5 '
Although the Smith opinion limited its holding to the narrow case
of firearms used for barter in drug transactions, the language in the
decision nevertheless guided the lower courts to broadly construe the
statute by strongly implying that the "use" requirement be interpreted
in such a fashion.' 52 For example, the majority declared that "the
word 'use' is 'expansive' and extends to situations where the gun is
not actively employed."' 53 Furthermore, the Court declared that the
statute's language "sweeps broadly, punishing any 'use' of a firearm,
so long as the use is 'during and in relation to' a drug trafficking of-
fense."154 The Court then broadly defined the requirement, stating
that the firearm "at least must 'facilitate, or have the potential of faili-
147 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
148 Bailey v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 501 (1995).
149 Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223 (1993). The Smith Court held that the defini-
tion of "use" under § 924(c) (1) was broad enough to reach guns used as barter in a drug
transaction. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
150 See Baile, 116 S. Ct. at 508.
151 See Smith, 508 U.S. at 223.
152 Id
153 Id. at 229 (citing United States v. Long, 905 F.2d 1572 (D.C. Cir. 1990)).
154 Id. The Court stated that the phrase "in relation to" clarified that the presence or
involvement of the firearm cannot be the result of accident or coincidence, but rather
must have some purpose or effect with respect to the predicate offense. I&. at 238.
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tating' the drug trafficking offense."' 55
The broad definition of "use" was strengthened by Justice Black-
mun's concurrence in Smith.' 56 Justice Blackmun believed that
§ 924(c) (1) required that a firearm do more than merely facilitate a
crime of violence or drug trafficking crime in order to constitute "use
in relation to a predicate offense." 57 The fact thatJustice Blackmun
highlighted this belief in a separate concurring opinion implied that
the majority intended mere facilitation to constitute "use of a firearm"
within the meaning of § 924(c) (1).158
The Smith court's broad definition of "use" was further evidenced
by Justice Scalia's dissent.' 59 Justice Scalia wrote that by failing to nar-
row the definition of "use" in a meaningful fashion, the majority inter-
preted the term to mean "use for any purpose." 6 0 He then asserted
that the majority's broad interpretation of § 924(c) (1) failed to ade-
quately distinguish penalizing under the "use" prong of the statute
from penalizing under the "carry" prong.' 6 '
The Bailey court, by establishing a narrow definition of use, not
only limited Smith's holding to its facts, but actually negated, albeit
correctly, the Smith court's expansive definition of "use."162 Thus,
although the decision in Bailey is consistent with the fact-specific hold-
ing in Smith,' 63 the Bailey court's contention that Smith's interpretation
of use "adhered to an active meaning of the term" is an attempt to
nullify the Smith court's broad interpretation without admitting the
155 Id (citing United States v. Stewart, 779 F.2d 538, 540 (9th Cir. 1985) (Kennedy, J.));
accord United States v. Ocampo, 890 F.2d 1363, 1371-72 (7th Cir. 1989).
156 Smith, 508 U.S. at 241 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
'57 Id. at 241 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Despite disagreeing with the majority's stan-
dard, Justice Blackmun agreed that a reasonable construction of the phrase included trad-
ing a weapon for drugs. I& Therefore, he felt it unnecessary to define the exact contours
of the language under § 924(c) (1). Id.
158 Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring).
159 Id. at 241-47 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justices Stevens and Souter also joined in the
dissent. I.
160 Id. at 246 (ScaliaJ., dissenting). Responding to the dissent's argument, the majority
denied expanding the phrase "using a firearm" to "use for any purpose whatever," but
instead asserted that the term was broad enough to include using a firearm for trade and
as a weapon. I& at 236. The majority's contention that use did not mean "use for any
purpose" loses credibility when read in the context of the rest of the decision, wherein the
Court purported to punish any use of a firearm that facilitated or had the potential of
facilitating an underlying drug trafficking offense. I&. at 229-38 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
161 Id. (ScaliaJ., dissenting). Justice Scalia felt that interpreting "use" to mean "use as a
weapon" would have narrowed the term's definition in a meaningful way, thereby produc-
ing a reasonable dichotomy between the two prongs of the statute. Id at 245-46 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
162 See Bailey v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 501 (1995).
163 Id. at 508 (expressly stating that Bailey is not inconsistent with Smith).
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faults of that interpretation.'" Instead, the Bailey Court should have
been honest and explicitly stated its intention to year away from
Smith's broad interpretation of "use", rather than forcing lower courts
to infer the Bailey court's true intention.
The fact that the Bailey decision was unanimous illustrated that
the Court had shifted gears in its reasoning since Smith.165 Justice
Blackmun's joining the opinion signified that the statute now re-
quired more than evidence of mere facilitation of the predicate crime
in order for a defendant's conduct to constitute "use" under the stat-
ute.1 6 6 Furthermore,Justice Scalia's agreement with the new interpre-
tation illustrated that the "active employment" standard meaningfully
narrowed the definition of "use" so as to adequately distinguish "us-
ing" a firearm from "carrying" one.16 7 In fact, Justice O'Connor ex-
pressly stated in Bailey that "a more limited, active interpretation of
'use' preserves a meaningful role for 'carries' as an alternative basis
for a charge."' 68 By using the same argument put forth by Justice
Scalia in his dissent in Smith, Justice O'Connor provided even further
evidence that the Court changed its position regarding the proper
breadth of scope for § 924(c) (1).169
C. IMPLICATIONS OF BAILM' FUTURE BROADENING UNDER THE CARRY
PRONG?
In the course of defining the scope of § 924(c) (1), the Court con-
sidered only the "use" prong of § 924(c) (1).170 However, the Court
did point out that the government could employ the "carry" prong of
the statute as an additional means with which to charge criminals who
mix guns and drugs.17 1 In doing so, the Court expressly stated that
"the 'carry' prong of § 924(c) (1) . . . brings some offenders who
164 Id. The Court also contended that Smith only ruled on whether barter came within
the meaning of § 924(c) (1) and that it did not address the question of what is required for
ajury to rule that a firearm had been used at all. d. While the actual fact-specific holding
supports this contention, the overall decision, as previously discussed, made implications
regarding the overall scope of the statute. See supra notes 148-61 and accompanying text.
165 See Bailey, 116 S. Ct. at 503.
166 See generally Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 241 (1994) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring).
167 See generally supra notes 145-47 and accompanying text.
168 Bailey, 116 S. Ct. at 507.
169 Compare Smith, 508 U.S. at 245-46 with Bailey, 116 S. Ct. at 507 (each speaking of the
need to narrow the definition of"use" in order to provide a clear distinction between the
two prongs of the statute).
170 Baiey, 116 S. Ct. at 509. Because the Court of Appeals did not consider liability
under the "carry" prong of the statute, the Court refused to rule on the issue and instead




would not satisfy the 'use' prong within the reach of the statute.' 72
Although the Court properly declined to define the scope of the
"carry" prong, as the issue was not before the Court, its suggestion that
prosecutors employ the "carry" prong of the statute could invite prose-
cutors and lower courts to once again expand the scope of
§ 924(c) (1) by defining "carry" broadly1 73
Despite this possibility of re-expansion, courts should resist inter-
preting the statute in a way that reaches the very conduct that the
Bailey court excluded from coverage under the "use" prong. 74
Although the "carry" prong of the statute should prohibit a broader
range of conduct than the "use" prong, courts must still narrow the
definition of "carry" in a way that differentiates § 924(c) (1) from
other statutes that prohibit "possessing" and "intending to use" a fire-
arm.175 By allowing the "carry" prong to reach conduct that falls short
of active employment, § 924(c) (1) will adequately distinguish between
"using a firearm" and "carrying a firearm." On the other hand,
preventing the statute from reaching situations where a defendant
merely stores a firearm near drugs, courts will assure that the defini-
tion of "carry" has meaning beyond "possession" or "intent to use."176
Adhering to these definitional limitations leaves little room for the
courts to define "carrying a firearm" in accordance with its ordinary
meaning. 77 One workable definition of the "carry" prong, however,
would punish a defendant who keeps a gun hidden in his or her cloth-
ing throughout a drug transaction. 178
It remains to be seen how courts will define the carry prong of
§ 924(c) (1) or whether the carry prong will entirely swallow up and
negate the narrow interpretation of § 924(c) (1) established by the
Court in Bailey.179 However, in light of the Bailey court's suggestion
that prosecuting under the "carry" prong can broaden the scope of
the statute's coverage, courts should be wary of expanding the scope
172 Id.
173 Id.
174 See id. at 505 (excluding from § 924(c) (1) coverage situations wherein a firearm is
merely in proximity to and accessible during a drug transaction).
175 Adhering to these limitations will adequately distinguish between the two statutory
prongs while preventing a definition of "carry" that is synonymous with "possession" or
"intent to use." Id. at 506-09.
176 Despite the fact that such storage may increase a defendant's confidence, thereby
facilitating his crime, storage is synonymous with intention to use, or in the absence of
evidence showing intent, possession. Id. at 508.
177 "When a word is not defined by statute, we normally construe it in accord with its
ordinary or natural meaning." Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 228 (1993); see also
Bailey, 116 S. Ct. at 506.




too far, lest they violate the rules of statutory construction adhered to
by the Supreme Court while defining "use" under § 924(c) (1).180
VI. CONCLUSION
In a unanimous opinion written by Justice O'Connor, the Bailey
Court correctly concluded that a defendant must "actively employ" a
firearm in a manner that makes the firearm an operative factor in the
predicate crime in order to violate 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1).Is8 This con-
clusion created a narrow active-based definition of § 924(c) (1) that
was in line with congressional intent. As a result, the Bailey decision
nullified the implications of Smith v. United States, in which Justice
O'Connor implied that Congress intended the scope of § 924(c) (1) to
be broad and far-reaching. Consequently, the Court's contention that
Bailey purported to adhere to Smith's precedent was an attempt to sal-
vage its previous statutory interpretation while functionally putting
that previous interpretation to rest.
Although Bailey limited the scope of § 924(c) (1) by narrowing
the definition of "using a firearm," the Court gave the government a
method by which to re-expand the statute's scope by suggesting that
the government prosecute criminals under the "carry" prong of
§ 924(c) (1). When interpreting this prong of § 924(c) (1), however,
courts should resist from expanding the statute's scope to reach situa-
tions where a gun is merely stored in proximity to a drug transaction
and is accessible during that transaction.
ALAN M. GILBERT
180 See id. at 501.
181 ad. at 505.
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